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No. 4]

RECENT DECISIONS

and the operation of the statute in question is as unjustifiable as would be a tax
on tangible personal property graduated upward on each additional unit owned.
To refute the contention that he who sells more is in receipt of greater proportional profit the court quotes from the case of the United States Glue Company
v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 328, 38 Sup. Ct. 499, 62 L. ed. 1135 (1918),
which distinguishes between the effect of a tax measured by gross sales and one
measured by net income. In the instant case the court points out that the existence of large gross sales does not always indicate a high net profit, and that
a tax on gross sales might spell the difference between a net loss and a net profit.
This was exemplified by the actual experience of one of the petitioners who
would have sustained a loss had the tax been enforced. In reconciling the holding
of the instant case with that of State Tax Co'nissionersv. Jackson, 283 U.S.
527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540, 75 L. ed. 1248 (1931), where a tax on chain stores graduated
with the number of unit stores operated was held valid, the court says that the
graduation in that case was justified by the advantages incidental to the management of multiple store systems. In the instant case the court has no recognition
for the advantages incidental to and based on a large number of sales rather
than unit stores. The majority opinion concludes with the remark that nothing
had been presented to show that the result sought in the instant act could not
be accomplished by a flat tax on sales or a graduated profit tax.
In presenting the dissenting opinion, Justice Cardozo points out that the
great bulk of the evidence seems to indicate that up to a certain point the profits
of a business increase in a greater proportion than do the gross sales and relies
on such cases as State Tax Commissioner v. Jackson, supra, (reconciled in tho
majority opinion) and Pacific American Fisheries v. Alaska, 269 U.S. 269, 46
Sup. Ct. 110, 70 L. ed. 270 (1925) (tax graduated according to the number of
cases of salmon packed) to sustain the proposition that graduated taxes have
been levied on enterprises on the basis of size alone with no reference to profits.
The Justice quotes economic authorities to show that a flat tax is unsatisfactory
because the small business man has greater difficulty in passing it on to the consumer than has the larger enterprise, and points out that the gross sales item
is far easier to obtain and assess than the elusive and easily camouflaged net
income figure.
In balancing the opinions, majority and dissenting, it becomes apparent that
the instant case was not decided so much upon legal theory as upon the beliefs
of the members of the court as to certain economic facts. The majority holds, in
short, that gross sales is not positively indicative of ability to pay a tax and
points to the experience of one of the petitioners. The minority concedes that
some inequality and some injustice may attend the levying of the tax but holds
that the law regards not invariable sequences but probabilities and tendencies.
Clark v. Titusville, 184 U.S. 329, 46 L. ed. 569, 22 Sup. Ct. 382 (1901). Of this
case it can be said that it is another in that long and confusing series of decisions necessitated by the efforts of the states to pass income taxes under the
mask of license, revenue, and sales taxes.
ERNEST 0. EISENBERG
CONTRACTS-ILLEGAL-UNENFORCEABILTY.-The

plaintiff, a band director of

considerable reputation, sued for money due under a contract in which he allowed the defendant the exclusive use of his name and the name of his band in
the advertising of the defendant's band instruments. Plaintiff also agreed under
the contract to include in all his own announcements the statement that he
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and his band used the defendant's musical instruments exclusively. Upon proof
that the plaintiff's band did not use the defendant's instruments exclusively the
trial court denied recovery on the ground that the misrepresentation was contrary to public policy and to Wis. STAT. (1933) §343.413 (1). On appeal, Held,
affirmed; the agreement being in violation of a penal law, no recovery may be
had under it. Kryl v. Frank Holton & Co., (Wis. 1935) 259 N.W. 828.
The statute in question originated in the 1913 session of the legislature, Wis.
Laws 1913, c. 510, and forbids the use of false advertising statements by anyone
interested in the sale of anything to the public. The statute provides that violation
of it shall be a misdemeanor but does not determine the court's decision in a
civil action in which a violation of the statute is involved. In the case of the
Street Railway Adv. Co. v. Lavo Co., 184 Wis. 395, 198 N.W. 595 (1924), a
foreign corporation was denied recovery of damages for breach of contract because of its failure to obtain a license to do business in the state as required
by Wis. STAT. (1921) §1770b(2) [See Wis. STAT. (1933) §226.02(1)]. However,
the statute specifically provided that contracts made in violation of it should be
void. Wis. STAT. (1921) §1770b (10) [See Wis. STAT. (1933) §226.02(9)]. Consistent with the holding of the Street Railway case, supra, was the decision of
Coules v. Pharris,212 Wis. 558, 250 N.W. 404 (1933), denying an alien illegally
in this country the right to sue for services rendered. This case is criticized,
however, in Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 679,
696, and in (1934) 18 Marq. L. Rev. 133. In Washington County v. Groth, 198
Wis. 56, 223 N.W. 575 (1929), however, the court abandoned the doctrine of
strict illegality and allowed the plaintiff county to enforce the liability of the
county clerk's surety on a contract illegal because of the clerk's financial interest
therein. The court in the Washington County case, supra, formulated the rule
that where the contract is not strictly prohibited nor mahm in se, or where the
parties are not in par delicto, the court will look to the purpose and intent of
the statute. In the instant case the court might well have followed this rule.
The problem, of course, is an administrative one and while on the one side
there is the danger of enforcing a statute to an end ultimately contrary to its
purpose, Short v. Bullion-Beck & Champion Mining Company, 20 Utah 20, 57
Pac. 720 (1899), on the other hand it seems that the common weal will best be
served by the court's refusing to listen to petitions to enforce a right obtained
through the violation of a statute. In the instant case the legislature no doubt
had the intention of protecting the buying public and limiting the advertising
activity of selling to the public. The extension of the statute to include the fact
situation of the instant case seems not unwarranted.
JOHN L. WADDLETON

MORTGAGES-CLOGGING THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTIN.-In default on interest
and taxes, the mortgage indebtedness also having accrued, the mortgagors, husband and wife, executed a conveyance, in form a deed absolute, to the mortgagee.
The testimony is conflicting as to the nature of parol agreements made when
the deed was given. The mortgagors contend that the mortgagee promised them
the same right to redeem as they would have under a mortgage. The mortgagee
claimed the oral agreement was to the effect that the mortgagors would be entitled to any money, exceeding $6,000, realized by a resale of the premises within
a year; $6,000 was approximately the amount of the indebtedness and represented the consideration for the deed. Eight months later the mortgagee gave

